

LONDON RESILIENCE



preparing for emergencies

Strategic Emergency Plan

An overview of the Strategic London response to emergencies; summaries and highlights of pan-London arrangements.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Strategic Emergency Plan aims to give a comprehensive overview of London's co-ordinated response to emergencies by summarising six key plans and procedures produced by the London Resilience Partnership.

The plans covered are:

London Command and Control Protocol.

This protocol details the strategic arrangements for London's response to 'emergencies' – whether 'Sudden Impact' or 'Rising Tide' in nature. The main areas covered are; explanation of terms, Major Incident Procedure, Catastrophic Incidents, Regional Civil Contingencies Committees. It also explains London's strategic emergency planning regime.

Media/Public Information Protocol

The media protocol has been developed to ensure that in the event of a catastrophic incident there will be an operation in place to oversee the flow of public information, respond to media queries, handle requests for media interviews, brief the media on a regular basis, establish a multi agency Media Centre and ensure that the media are able to report the incident safely and fairly.

The protocol covers the timing/activation of the media operation, establishment of a combined central press office and media centre, details of the central press team, multi-agency media centres, the role of the Media Emergency Forum (and the London Regional Media Emergency Forum) and the Significant Incidents Media Protocol.

Mass Fatality plan

The London Mass Fatality plan details the co-ordination of the response to an incident where a large number of fatalities are involved. It covers arrangements for the recovery, transportation, identification and disposal of the dead, and provision of suitable mortuary facilities.

Specifically it details activation of the plan, members of the mass fatalities co-ordination team, situations that will require consideration of a resilience mortuary, special requirements for CBRN incidents and the roles and responsibilities of agencies under the mass fatality plan.

Large Scale Evacuation

In certain emergencies, the decision may be made to evacuate a part of London. A framework document (known as "Operation Sassoon") details the principles of large-scale evacuation, activation of the plan, large-scale evacuation mechanisms, evacuation shelters and the roles and responsibilities of agencies under the plan.

Site Clearance

The Site Clearance Plan is concerned with the removal of debris – potentially on the scale of the attack on the World Trade Centre in September 2001, which produced over 1.6 m tons of debris.

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Details include the phases of the site clearance process - rescue and recovery, site stabilisation, site preservation (investigation), site clearance & establishment of bulk debris examination sites/landfill sites, transportation, police consultation and the roles and responsibilities of agencies under the plan.

Disaster Fund

A Public Disaster Appeal Fund has been developed by the GLA for use in the event of a catastrophic event occurring in the Greater London area. It is the only one endorsed and supported by the LRRF and its members in order to avoid the practical and legal confusion that may occur in the event of several funds being established. This section details how to activate the fund and the trustees of the fund.

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

Aim of this document

1. The Aim of this document is to set out the strategic regional response of the agencies that make up the London Resilience Partnership to incidents requiring multi-agency co-ordination on a pan-London basis.
2. It should be read in conjunction with the LESLP Major Incident Procedure Manual as the agreed basis upon which the emergency services work in London.

Objectives of this document

3. To summarise and collate the key plans and procedures produced through the work of the London Resilience Partnership which would be activated in the event of a large scale incident occurring in London.
4. To give an overview of the response to ensure understanding within the London Resilience Partnership
5. To outline roles and responsibilities of agencies under the different plans
6. To provide a basis for joining up existing LRRF work-streams under one document

Audience

7. This document is intended for Gold level representatives of agencies and organisations within the London Resilience Partnership who would have a role to play in the response.
8. Therefore it provides a general overview of plans in place and the outline roles and responsibilities. Further details are available within specific plans, copies of which are available to responding agencies from the London Resilience Team (LRT).
9. Specifically these include:
 - Command and Control
 - London Mass Fatality Plan
 - Large Scale Evacuation
 - Site Clearance
 - Communications
 - Disaster Fund
10. LRT also hold copies of the latest version of plans which are still in development, and can provide these to the Gold Co-ordinating Group. All responding agencies will hold copies of specific plans relevant to themselves; this document provides a strategic overview.

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

Development of the Document

11. By necessity, this will be a fluid document, requiring updating on a regular basis. Version 2 of this document was agreed at the meeting of the London Regional Resilience Forum on 3rd March 2005. Some minor amendments have been made to create this published Version 2.1. This plan will be reviewed and further versions created as individual plans evolve and developments under the Civil Contingencies Act necessitate.

Security Classification

12. Following approval of this document at the March 2005 meeting of the LRRF, this document is unrestricted and can therefore be shared with interested parties. In order to make this document accessible to all those with an interest it can be found on the internet at: www.londonprepared.gov.uk

Queries

13. For any comments or queries concerning this document, please contact the London Resilience Team on 020 7217 3039 or enquiries-lrt.gov@go-regions.gsi.gov.uk

SECTION 2 – LONDON COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTOCOL

Introduction

1. This is the London Regional Resilience Forum Command and Control protocol for dealing with an “emergency” as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. It details the strategic arrangements for London’s response to “emergencies” that are either “Sudden Impact” or “Rising Tide” in origin and the structure for Pan London emergency planning.
2. This current version of the command and control protocol was agreed at the London Regional Resilience Forum on the 3rd March 2005.
3. This protocol consists of five parts:
 - Introduction and Explanatory terms (paragraphs 1–11)
 - Major Incident Procedure (paragraphs 12-15)
 - Catastrophic Incidents (paragraphs 16-53)
 - Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (paragraphs 54-78)
 - Strategic Emergency Planning for London (paragraphs 79-88)
4. This London Regional Resilience Forum Command and Control Protocol is designed to be compatible with both the Regional and National Command and Control frameworks.

Explanatory Terms

Civil Contingencies Act – Definition of an Emergency

“An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom, the environment of a place in the United Kingdom or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom”

(Cabinet Office 2005a).

Type and Scale of “Emergency”

5. From a command and control perspective “emergency” events or situations generally fall into one of three categories, those that happen without warning and require an immediate response, those that are identified and are some way off allowing for a period of pre-planning and those events or situations that are reasonably foreseeable therefore providing the opportunity to prepare contingency plans. Regardless of the perceived timescales, “emergency” events or situations will require resourcing and co-ordination on a local, regional or national scale.

Explanation of Type of “Emergency”

6. Sudden Impact - This type of event or situation happens with little or no prior warning. The effects are usually felt immediately and include transportation accidents, utility failure, industrial accidents or acts of terrorism etc.

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7. Rising Tide - This type of event or situation has a lead in time of days, weeks or even months and includes health pandemics, flooding, foot and mouth disease, industrial action etc. The onset can be gradual and the final impact may not always be apparent early on.
8. Strategic Emergency Planning - Regional (London) strategic emergency preparedness and resilience planning undertaken by the London Regional Resilience Forum.

Explanation of Scale of “Emergency”

9. Local (Borough) – Day to day events or situations that are dealt with as a matter of routine and do not require any special arrangements beyond those that are already in place.
10. Regional (London) – Events or situations that require a pre-planned and co-ordinated response between responding organisations but which are capable of being resourced, in the main, from existing regional assets which may on occasions require supplementing with limited mutual aid from a neighbouring region(s). May require Regional and/or Central Government involvement.
11. National (U.K.) - Events or situations that are of such magnitude that it is beyond the regional capability to resource without the sustained support of other region(s). Central Government involvement will be necessary from the outset.

Major Incident Procedure

Major Incident (Emergency)

12. For “emergencies” deemed “Sudden Impact” and requiring immediate deployment (and strategic co-ordination) of resources on a Regional or National scale there is one option (Gold Co-ordinating Group) with two levels of response (Major Incident or Catastrophic Incident) for strategic management (See paragraph 53 for explanation of “Gold”).

Definition of a Major Incident

A Major Incident is any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or all of the emergency services and will generally include the involvement, either directly, or indirectly, of large numbers of people. For example:

- The rescue and transportation of a large number of casualties;
- The large scale combined resources of the Police, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service;
- The mobilization and organisation of the emergency services and support services, for example local authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people; and
- The handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media usually made to the Police.

(LESLP 6th Edition)

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13. Representation at the Gold Co-ordinating Group for Major Incidents is defined within the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual.
14. The key point to note is that representation at the Gold Co-ordinating Group by Central Government is not considered necessary from the outset when dealing with a Major Incident. However the Government Liaison Team (GLT) is available to join the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) if the situation so requires.
15. To view and download a copy of the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual, which details the Command and Control and multi agency working agreements go to www.leslp.gov.uk

Catastrophic Incidents

Definition of a Catastrophic Incident

A Catastrophic Incident is a Major Incident where following the advice of the emergency services, the Designated Minister* is of the opinion that it is of such magnitude that it will require a specific, or exceptional response from members of the London Regional Resilience Forum. Their strategic priorities will be to assist with both the immediate issues and achieving a return to normality. In doing so it is recognized that full Government involvement will be required.

(London Regional Resilience Forum 2003)

*Usually the minister with responsibility for London Resilience or the Home Secretary.

Catastrophic Incident - Characteristics

16. The key specific characteristics of the response to a declared Catastrophic Incident are:
 - The engagement of Central Government from the outset.
 - The pre agreed attendance of specific key organisations to the nominated Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) following the formal declaration of a Catastrophic Incident.

Catastrophic Incident – Concept of Operation

17. The London Catastrophic Incident Command and Control Protocol has been designed to supplement and enhance the existing Command and Control arrangements such as those laid down in the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual, to meet the challenges of incidents of such magnitude.
18. A noticeable enhancement under the Catastrophic Incident Command and Control Protocol is the immediate and pre agreed attendance of specific key organisations and stakeholders to the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) following the formal declaration of a Catastrophic Incident.
19. It should be remembered that the Catastrophic Incident Command and Control arrangements are primarily designed for “Sudden Impact” events or incidents.

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20. The Formal declaration of a Catastrophic Incident brings together Central and Regional Government and key organisations at a Strategic level to develop and support a coordinated strategy. Paragraphs 21-53 give a broad outline of the working arrangements.

Central Government Coordination (COBR)

21. Central Government co-ordination and support for a Catastrophic Incident is usually undertaken from the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) and may be led by the Prime Minister (or Senior Minister nominated by the Prime Minister).

Government Liaison Team (GLT)

22. The role of the Government Liaison Team (GLT) is to provide the link between strategic decision making by the Gold Co-ordinating Group at the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) and the Central Government overview and response provided at the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR).
23. The Government Liaison Officer (GLO) is a member of the Government Liaison Team (GLT) from the lead Government Department at COBR and is a key member of the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) whose role is to provide the vital communication conduit between the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) and COBR through the Government Liaison Team (GLT).
24. The Government Liaison Team (GLT) will include representatives of the London Resilience Team (LRT).
25. Under certain circumstances, such as operational disruption in the City of London or Canary Wharf, a Finance Cell (a Gold Member and 2 support staff) staffed by HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority, will be included within the Government Liaison Team (GLT).
26. The role of the Gold Finance Member is to advise the Government Liaison Officer (GLO) on the impact to the financial sector of the incident and how it could be mitigated. The Government Liaison Officer will pass financial sector information to Gold Coordinating Group (GCG). Gold Finance is not represented at GCG unless specifically invited.

Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC)

27. The Strategic Coordination Centre is a location nominated by the Police Gold (primary and fallback locations have been pre agreed) at which the Government Liaison Team (GLT) and all appointed Gold level representatives from the responding organisations will convene.
28. Functional Gold Groups (known as cells) e.g. Transport, Utilities, Police etc. are located within the SCC and house Gold support staff along with their communication and administrative facilities.

Gold Coordinating Group (GCG)

29. The primary role of the Gold Coordinating Group is to set strategic aim(s) for the incident and to coordinate the responding organisations in line with National priorities that have been agreed with COBR.
30. At the outset a Senior Police Officer will act as Chair of the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) and has the responsibility for the strategic direction of the

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incident and ensuring the strategic decision making process is documented. In addition to this role the Police will also appoint a Police Gold.

31. Members of the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) will be from the Gold Level Representatives located in the SCC. The Gold Coordinating Group Chair will be responsible for ensuring that Gold attendees invited for meeting(s) are consistent with the priorities and issues to be addressed.
32. Due to the strategic response required it is important that the Gold Coordinating Group retain the capability of effective fast-time decision making, therefore attendance at Gold Coordinating Group meetings will involve those organisations and stakeholders necessary to address the incident priorities at the time. It is for this reason that the Chair of the Gold Coordinating Group holds responsibility for the composition of representatives for each Gold meeting. Figure 1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG).

Gold Representatives Attending the SCC

33. Gold level representatives nominated to attend the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) must be empowered to take corporate decisions on behalf of their parent organisation in support of the overall Gold Coordination Group strategy. It is therefore essential that Gold representatives are invested with the authority necessary to undertake the role and provided with the necessary back up and support to ensure any undertaking given by them to the Gold Coordinating Group is actionable.

Military Aid (London District)

34. Military Headquarters London District will appoint a Joint [Service] Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) who will attend the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) in the event of a Catastrophic Incident. The Military Liaison Officer will attend the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) meetings as appropriate and will provide a single point of contact for Military Aid requests, which should be made through the Chair of the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) to the London District Military Operation Centre.
35. There are a number of caveats for requesting Military Aid which are:
 - It has been demonstrated that the use of mutual aid, other organisations, and the private sector is impossible or unsuitable, and that MOD assistance is sought as a last resort;
 - The civil authorities lack the required level of capability and it is unreasonable for them to expect to develop one; or
 - The civil authorities have the capability, but the need to act is urgent and there is an immediate lack of civil resources.
36. Military resources are not specifically set aside for assisting in a Catastrophic Incident, so any assistance will depend on what assets are available at the time.
37. Defence Ministerial approval* for the deployment of Military assets is required. Military assets will always be deployed as self-contained units under the

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command of their own officers. * Except where there is an immediate threat to life, the local Military Commander can authorise local deployment.

London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)

38. In the event of a formally declared Catastrophic Incident a London Local Authority Chief Executive will be nominated as London Local Authority Gold. London Local Authority Gold is empowered to represent and give undertaking(s) on behalf of London's 32 Boroughs and the Corporation of London.
39. It is important to note that London Local Authority Gold is empowered by the formal declaration of a Catastrophic Incident.

Gold Support at the SCC

40. The Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) provides 'Gold Cells' to accommodate the Gold level representative (and their support personnel) from the organisations and stakeholders that attend in response to the formal declaration of a Catastrophic Incident.
41. Where Gold representatives from the same field (e.g. transport, utilities, Police etc.) represent different aspects they will be co-located where appropriate.
42. This arrangement allows organisations to share information and discuss their strategic response options in support of Gold Coordination Group decision making. This also provides a communication point between each Gold representative and their parent organisation.
43. Additional Gold Cells will be created as necessary to accommodate Gold representatives who are subsequently requested (in addition to the pre agreed attendance of specific key organisations and stakeholders) to support the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG).

Health Advice (Joint Health Advisory Cell – JHAC)

44. The Joint Health Advisory Cell (JHAC) provides authoritative advice on the public health aspects of an incident. JHAC is a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary group and comprises representatives from a range of scientific and health organisations. The group is chaired by a Senior Health professional who will attend the Gold Coordinating Group Meetings to offer Health Advice and take away issues for the JHAC to consider.
45. The Joint Health Advisory Cell (JHAC) at the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) sits in addition to, but nevertheless compliments the functions of Ambulance and Health Gold representatives.

Media / Public Information

46. A Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) Media Gold, usually provided by the Metropolitan Police Service, will be responsible for coordinating the activities of the media cell at the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) and representing them at the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) meetings.
47. The media cell, located at the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC), in consultation with the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) will advise and assist in communicating with external news organisations through the News Co-

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ordination Centre (Central Government Department, remotely located) who will be linked direct to COBR.

48. To maintain confidence it is crucial that all information provided to the public (particularly health/scientific advice) is consistent before being authorised for release to the media. It is therefore important that very close links exist between the Gold Co-ordinating Group and COBR to achieve this.
49. The Mayor of London will act as the 'voice of London' in order to provide clear information and guidance to London's population. This will be supported by a media strategy that will also provide spokespersons from the emergency services, Government and other organisations to provide detailed information as necessary. In order to achieve this, the Mayor will be closely linked to COBR and the Gold Co-ordinating Group (GCG) through the News Co-ordination Centre and Gold Co-ordinating Group (GCG) Media Cell.

Recovery Management Cell

50. A Recovery Management Cell will act in support of the Gold Co-ordinating Group in planning for and advising on the recovery phase of a Catastrophic Incident.
51. The role of the Recovery Management Cell is to consider the long-term recovery needs and plan for and advise on the longer-term recovery management strategy in consultation and agreement with the Gold Co-ordinating Group in liaison with Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS).
52. Local Authority Gold will provide the link between the Gold Co-ordinating Group and the Recovery Management Cell.

Explanation of Strategic Tactical and Operational Roles

53. The following explanation and definitions are taken from the 6th Edition of the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel Major Incident Procedure Manual.

Gold (Strategic)

Gold is the Commander in overall charge of each service, responsible for formulating the strategy for the incident. Each Gold has overall command of the resources of their own organisation, but delegates tactical decisions to their respective Silver(s).

At the outset of the incident Gold will determine the strategy and record a strategy statement. This will be monitored and subject to ongoing review.

Silver (Tactical)

Silver will attend the scene, take charge and be responsible for formulating the tactics to be adopted by their service to achieve the strategy set by Gold. Silver should not become personally involved with the activities close to the incident, but remain detached.

Bronze (Operational)

Bronze will control the resources of their respective service within a geographical sector or specific role and implement the tactics defined by Silver.

(LESLP 6th Edition)

Figure 1 – Representation of the Gold Coordinating Group




Figure 2 - Agencies Who Attend the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) on the Formal Declaration of a Catastrophic Incident

1. Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
2. City of London Police (CoLP)
3. British Transport Police (BTP)
4. Ministry of Defence Police (MDP)
5. Military Liaison Officer (London District)
6. London Fire Brigade (LFB)
7. London Ambulance Service (LAS)
8. Government Liaison Team (GLT)
9. London National Health Service (NHS)/Primary Care Trust
10. Joint Health Advisory Cell (JHAC)
11. London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)
12. London Underground (LU)
13. Transport for London (TfL)
14. Network Rail
15. Port of London Authority (PLA)
16. Transco
17. National Grid
18. Thames Water
19. British Telecom

Note: Additional organisations and agencies may also be invited to attend the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) as appropriate to the circumstances prevailing at the time (e.g. Voluntary Agencies, Aviation Sector etc.)

Regional Civil Contingencies Committee

Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC)

54. In broad terms the Civil Contingencies Act will provide a framework that enables Central, Regional and Local Government to plan for and co-ordinate the response to an “emergency” (see definition at Page 1 Section2).
55. The Civil Contingencies Act Regulations and Guidance provide for the establishment of Regional Civil Contingencies Committees (RCCC) to coordinate the Regional response. The Guidance proposes the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) will meet at three levels.

For “emergencies” deemed “Rising Tide” there is one option (Regional Civil Contingencies Committee) with three levels of response for strategic management.

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Level 1 RCCC – Level one meetings would be convened in the phase prior to an emergency, where prior warning is available. Meetings would be held to review the situation, update local stakeholders, and establish the state of preparedness across the region. Examples could include where a significant human or animal disease outbreak seemed likely, or in advance of forecast extreme weather.

Level 2 RCCC – Level two meetings will co-ordinate the response to an emergency across a region. They are likely to prove particularly useful in the consequence management effort and the recovery phase of an emergency.

A level two RCCC could, for example, be convened in the event of a wide-area disruptive challenge affecting a large portion of a region. They might also be convened if a national response or national co-ordination of an event was required, such as during a fuel distribution crisis.

Level 3 RCCC – Level three meetings could only be called following the formal declaration of a decision to take special legislative measures under part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act.

Level three meetings would be chaired by the Regional Nominated Co-ordinator.....The role of the RCCC would be as under level two but with an additional focus on the implementation of any special legislative measures necessary to respond to the emergency in question.

(Cabinet Office 2005b)

Regional Nominated Coordinator (RNC)

56. Under the Civil Contingencies Guidance the role of the Regional Nominated Coordinator (RNC) is Government appointed.
57. The Regional Nominated Coordinator (RNC) will only be appointed for Level 3 (special legislative measures) RCCC meetings.
58. NOTE: The Regional Resilience Forum (London Regional Resilience Forum) can pre agree individuals to Chair Level 1 and 2 RCCC meetings. If so, this can be included in future editions of this Protocol.

Category One and Two Responders

59. The composition of the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) is likely to be drawn from Category 1 and 2 responders as defined within the Civil Contingencies Act, supplemented with attendees (additional to Category 1 and 2 Responders) as necessary in line with the event or situation under consideration.
60. It is proposed to use the Government Office for London (or fallback location) as available for use if appropriate as the venue for the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) meetings. The London Resilience Team to provide secretariat. The guidance proposes a Generic Regional Response Plan be drawn up.

Figure 3 - Responding Agencies

Category One Responders

Metropolitan Police Service
 City of London Police
 British Transport Police
 London Fire Brigade
 London Ambulance Service
 London Borough Councils
 Corporation of London
 National Health Service Acute Trusts
 National Health Service Foundation Trusts
 Primary Care Trusts
 Health Protection Agency
 Environment Agency
 Maritime Coastguard Agency

Category Two Responders

Electricity Suppliers*
 Gas Suppliers*
 Water Undertakers*
 Public Communications Suppliers*
 Network Rail
 Train operating companies*
 Transport for London
 London Underground
 Airports*
 Harbours & Ports*
 Health and Safety Executive*
 Highways Agency

Category one are the core responders, while category two responders are the key co-operating bodies in both private and public sectors.

(Go to www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/20040036.htm where the Civil Contingencies Act can be viewed and downloaded)

*As defined in the Act and Regulations made under it

Rising Tide - Overview

61. There will be occasions where, through normal monitoring and horizon scanning, London Resilience Partnership organisations identify events or situations that although are some way off show the potential to impact on a scale that may well require a coordinated response by members of the resilience community, above and beyond that which has already been planned for.
62. Events or situations of this type are known as “Rising Tide” and are characterised by a lead-in time of days, weeks or even months. Health pandemics, flooding, Foot and Mouth Disease, industrial action etc. are examples of Rising Tide scenarios. The onset of such events can be gradual and the final impact will not always be apparent early on, which can make meaningful assessment of the scale and depth difficult to determine. It is for this reason that early sharing of information is essential to allow London Resilience Partnership organisations the opportunity to collectively monitor and assess developments as they unfold. This approach maximises the time available for a coordinated strategy to be developed, should this become necessary, before the full effects are felt.

Information Sharing (Timing)

63. Key to the success of dealing with Rising Tide scenarios is the timely identification of those events or situations where the early sharing of such information allows the London Resilience Partnership organisations a unique opportunity to consider the most appropriate course of action. It is not however plausible to define exactly what information should be shared by whom and when. Rather it should be for each of the London Resilience Partnership organisations to make an early assessment on the wider implications for any event or situation that they are aware of. It is at the point they recognise that an event or situation (Rising Tide in nature) has the potential to require a response or coordination beyond that which has already been planned for, especially multi-agency for example non-health impacts of a health event, that this information is shared with London Resilience Partnership organisations.

Information Sharing (Context)

64. When considering the trigger for the notification and sharing of information between London Resilience Partnership organisations it is useful to consider the context under which triggers may operate in practice. Many, if not all, the partner organisations will experience spikes or surges in demand and this is more often than not pre-planned for and managed within the capabilities of the organisation concerned. It is important that this protocol takes account of this fact and does not seek to undermine existing arrangements which are shown to be sound, rather it should provide the reassurance and flexibility that will allow partner organisations to manage within their capability during peak times of demand whilst providing the flexibility to inform others (giving an early “heads up” to a problem that may be coming their way) and the option to seek a coordinated multi-agency response at the appropriate time. In simple terms the notification and sharing of information between London Resilience Partnership organisations does not in itself mean a multi agency coordinated response is automatically necessary. On the majority of occasions it is anticipated that the sharing of information would be the only action required.

Information Management

65. “Operation Ringmain” is the interim solution to facilitate the sharing of information regarding Rising Tide events or situations between London Resilience Partnership organisations.
66. A permanent solution, in the form of a secure extranet, is currently being developed. This will allow for (amongst other uses) the deposit and retrieval of information regarding potential or actual Rising Tide events or situations to be placed there by any of the London Resilience Partnership organisations who have been authorised to do so.
67. Current estimates anticipate that the secure extranet is likely to come on line during 2005. The development of an extranet is therefore a vital component to the success of this protocol.

A Coordinated Response

68. There is a need for a “watch-keeper”. Their role would be to monitor the information on the extranet and to identify where individually or collectively

events may benefit from a coordinated approach and propose this to the London Resilience Partnership organisations. This however does not preclude any of the resilience partners suggesting from the outset that a coordinated approach should be adopted.

69. Maximum benefit will be gained if all partner organisations undertake the role of watch-keeper with formal responsibility resting with the London Resilience Team. In undertaking this role it should be made clear that in terms of frequency this is likely to be no more frequent than a daily check (for the most part) of the Rising Tide information deposited on the extranet, as by their very nature Rising Tide events or situations are days, weeks or months away.

Options for Multi-Agency Management

70. As mentioned earlier, the notification and sharing of information between resilience partners does not in itself mean a multi agency coordinated response is automatically necessary. Regular assessment of the information relating to Rising Tide events or situations that have been posted on the extranet, is likely to present the following options. The most appropriate option(s) will be dependant upon the perceived urgency for further discussion and/or coordination.

No Action Required at this Stage

71. No formal multi-agency coordination required – it is envisaged, that for the vast majority of events or situations notified, existing arrangements for multi-agency co-ordination will be adequate, and there will be no need for further multi-agency management arrangements. In these circumstances the information sharing has acted as a ‘back-stop’ and enabled all partner organisations to be aware of the event or situation, without necessarily needing to participate in the management, however continued monitoring of the event or situation may be appropriate.

Strategic Planning Response (Months) – London Regional Resilience Forum

72. Formally raise the issue at next scheduled meeting of the London Regional Resilience Forum – this approach is justified where the event or situation is not urgent at present and is perceived to be a considerable time away in terms of potential impact, for example the threat of industrial action.

Fast Time Response (Days) – Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC)

73. Convene the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC Level 1) – when a faster time, more prompt response is required to facilitate multi-agency planning, and in due course strategic management should this become necessary for the event or situation.

Immediate Response (24/7) – Gold Coordinating Group (GCG)

74. Initiate a meeting of the Gold Coordinating Group – This option is only considered appropriate where an immediate response for strategic multi agency coordination is necessary. This option is considered a most unlikely outcome from the analysis of information posted on the extranet. Far more realistically an event or situation requiring the immediate convening of the Gold Coordinating Group (GCG) would be initiated through the existing procedure

SECTION 2 – LONDON COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTOCOL

as laid down in the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel Manual (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual. However the Gold Coordinating Group may choose to use the extranet as a tool to provide information and updates to Resilience partners not directly involved.

Concept of Operation

75. When Strategic Co-ordination of an “emergency” is managed through the Gold Co-ordinating Group (GCG) or the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) structures, there is a fundamental principle to successful strategic co-ordination. This is to ensure that all actions taken in support of resolving an “emergency” are only undertaken with the knowledge and consent of the Gold Co-ordinating Group (GCG) or the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) as appropriate.
76. The commissioning of any action(s) outside of this fundamental principle, however well intentioned, will lead to a loss of strategic control and/or direction. It is of the utmost importance therefore that all representatives at the Gold Co-ordinating Group (GCG) or the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) adhere to this principle if effective strategic management is to be achieved and maintained.
77. Successful strategic management of an “emergency” requires a mutually agreed strategy where all stakeholders are kept fully aware/informed of each others actions and needs which is where the extranet as a tool can be used to disseminate situation updates and information. Self-interest must be balanced against the strategic priorities collectively agreed at the Gold Co-ordinating Group or Regional Civil Contingencies Committee.

Further Considerations

78. At the time of writing not all arrangements and aspects relating to “Rising Tide” events can be finalised. The Civil Contingencies Act will impact further on these arrangements as will the development of the extranet. This protocol will be revised at the appropriate time(s) to reflect current developments and is designed for London’s current response protocols.

Strategic Emergency Planning for London

London Regional Resilience Forum

79. The London Regional Resilience Forum was established in 2002 to address the strategic emergency planning and resilience needs of the Capital and draws together all the key agencies and stakeholders for this purpose.
80. The London Regional Resilience Forum is chaired by the Minister for Local and Regional Government (with responsibility for London Resilience) with the Mayor of London acting as the Deputy Chair. The London Regional Resilience Forum is supported in its work by a number of sub-committees and working groups that all contribute to developing policy and resilience.
81. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides for the establishment of Regional Resilience Forums. The Forums role in broad terms is to bring together Regional emergency planners, responders and other agencies and

stakeholders to ensure effective coordination and strategic planning is delivered across a range of key capabilities. It will also ensure effective coordination is achieved with Central and Regional Government.

82. The Regional Resilience Forum is not a statutory body as such, nor does it have powers to direct its members. The London Regional Resilience Forum will fulfil the role of the Regional Resilience Forum as defined within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

Sub-Committees – (London Regional Resilience Forum)

83. The London Regional Resilience Forum is supported in its work by a number of sub-committees that represent key agencies and stakeholders. The sub-committees develop and progress the London Resilience work plan as appropriate to their area of expertise. It also allows for each sub-committee to raise areas of concern for further consideration and stands ready to assist in progressing the decisions made by the members of the London Regional Resilience Forum.

Working Groups – (London Regional Resilience Forum)

84. The London Regional Resilience Forum or its sub-committees appoint working groups as appropriate to address specific issues. The working groups remain in existence for as long as is necessary. This approach allows for the necessary expertise to be drawn together in discrete working groups to address a specifically identified need or needs.

Local Resilience Forums

85. The role of Local Resilience Forums will be:
- To provide a two-way communication tool between category 1 & 2 responders (and between regional & borough groups).
 - To assist in ensuring strategic policy (set by the LRRF and/or nationally) is thoroughly understood and efficiently implemented at a borough level
 - To provide a consistent conduit for borough level responders to raise issues at the regional level.
86. The LRFs will also have responsibility for the compilation of Community Risk Registers.

London Resilience Team

87. The London Resilience Team supports the work of the London Regional Resilience Forum and its Sub-Committees and Working Groups. The London Resilience Team includes secondees drawn from the organisations represented at the London Regional Resilience Forum.
88. The London Resilience Team is led by a senior civil servant (Director of London Resilience) with a dedicated team of administrative support staff based within the Government Office for London.

**Figure 4 – London’s Strategic Emergency
Planning Structure**




Figure 5 - London Regional Resilience Forum

Terms of Reference

To provide a senior level central focus for co-ordinated and effective emergency planning in London, bringing together national government, the Mayor, and London's emergency services, other key public services and business community. The London Regional Resilience Forum will form an overarching steering group and provide practical supervision and strategic guidance to London's emergency planning. Its role will include the supervision and regular scrutiny of:

- Major threats to safety and public order
- London's security preparations
- London's preparedness to respond to major disasters
- Strategic emergency planning for London
- A generic pan-London emergency response plan
- Pre-planning work
- Command, control and inter-agency communication,
- Fall-back and consequence management arrangements,
- Inter-community relations,
- Capacity to respond to threats and resource issues
- Communication with the media
- Testing of arrangements

June 2002

Minister for Local Government and Regions (Chair)	Chair of Utilities Sub-committee
Mayor of London (Deputy Chair)	Chair of Health Sub-committee
Assistant Commissioner Metropolitan Police - Central Operations	Chair of Business Community Sub-committee
Commissioner, City of London Police	Chair of Communications Sub-committee
Chief Constable, British Transport Police	Home Office
Commissioner, London Fire Brigade	Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Chief of Staff, Headquarters, London District, Army	TRANSEC, Department for Transport
Chief Executive, London Ambulance Service	Port of London Authority
Chief Executive, Greater London Authority	London Coroners Group
Chief Executive, Association of London Government	Head, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office
Regional Director of Public Health, London	Network Rail
Chair of Blue Light Sub-committee	London Underground
Chair of Local Authority Sub-committee	BAA plc
Chair of Transport Sub-committee	Corporation of London
	Environment Agency
	Health Protection Agency
	Director, London Resilience Team (Secretary)
	Others - by invitation and as necessary

Meeting Frequency - Quarterly

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SECTION 3 – MEDIA / PUBLIC INFORMATION PROTOCOL

1. The London Regional Resilience Forum's Communications Sub Committee has produced a media protocol entitled "The Communications Implications of Handling a Crisis or Emergency in London". The protocol aims to ensure that in the event of a Catastrophic Incident there will be an operation in place to:
 - Oversee the flow of public information.
 - Respond to media queries, handle requests for media interview and have the capability in place to brief the media on a regular basis.
 - Where appropriate establish a multi agency Media Centre.
 - Ensure that the media are able to report the incident/crisis safely and fairly.
2. *This media/public information protocol was agreed in December 2003 and is currently being reviewed and updated.*

Timing/Activation

3. It is anticipated that the media operation will be run jointly with the Metropolitan Police (operationally in the lead) and the Cabinet Office's News Co-ordination Centre (NCC).

Establishment of a combined central press office and media centre

4. To ensure that there is the highest level of cross-government and cross-organisation co-ordination, individual 'lines to take' from the emergency services, government departments and other agencies involved will be shared with the NCC. Depending on the scale, location and duration of an incident, a combined central press office, situated close to the site of the incident, may be required.

Central Press Team

5. The composition of the central press team is likely to be made up of a combination of the following organisations:
 - Emergency Services Press Officers
 - Mayor's Office
 - Lead Government department
 - News Co-ordination Centre
 - London Resilience Team
 - Local Authority Press Officers
 - On-call Strategic Health Authority Communications lead
 - Transport for London
6. Mutual Aid arrangements may need to be activated in order to ensure adequate numbers of staff available at the scene and the Media Centre.

SECTION 3 – MEDIA / PUBLIC INFORMATION PROTOCOL

7. Other organisations that may be included:
 - Utilities (Telecom, Water, Gas and Electricity)
 - Ministry of Defence (if involved)
 - Other Transport Organisations (London Underground / Train Operating Companies / Network Rail / DLR)
 - Media Executives
 - Business representatives as appropriate

Multi-agency Media Centres

8. The Communications Sub Committee has commissioned the COI to identify suitable locations with existing media facilities strategically located around London which are able to act as media centres in the event of a Catastrophic Incident. Issues such as secure perimeters, speed of deployment, centralised information source and scaleable response mean only certain venues around London are capable of supporting such activity. Such sites have now been identified (most are existing sporting stadiums) and further work is being carried out to develop further critical criteria before a final choice of locations is made.

Role of the Media Emergency Forum and the London Regional Media Emergency Forum

9. Immediate issues and lessons to be learned will be incorporated into the media operation as soon as possible through the Media GOLD Group. In addition, the local and national MEF groups will provide a further focus for briefing the issues further and capitalising on any lessons learned.

Significant Incidents Media Protocol

10. A media protocol has been developed for “significant incidents” in order to make key groups press officers aware of incidents as soon as possible.
11. This protocol relies on the “Fastest Finger First” principle – ie whoever knows about an incident first informs the others via text and pager messages. The ability to communicate via conference call is also in place.
12. Press officers from the following organisations are part of the protocol:
 - GICS Operations Unit
 - Emergency Services
 - ALG
 - ODPM Press Office
 - Regional Co-ordination Unit
 - London Mayor’s Office
 - London Resilience Team

SECTION 3 – MEDIA / PUBLIC INFORMATION PROTOCOL

- Transport for London
- NHS
- (The representation of utilities companies in this protocol is being kept under review.)

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SECTION 4 – LONDON MASS FATALITY PLAN

1. The co-ordination of the response to an incident where a large number of fatalities are involved is covered in the London Mass Fatality Plan, which includes arrangements for the recovery, transportation, identification and disposal of the dead. It also includes the provision of suitable mortuary facilities.
2. *Responding agencies can find more detailed information in the full version of the London Mass Fatality Plan, the latest version is December 2004. A revised version is expected May 2005.*

Definitions

3. A Disaster Mortuary is a mortuary used following an incident involving a large number of fatalities. It may be situated in an existing mortuary (Designated) or at a specially prepared site (The Resilience Mortuary)
4. A Designated Disaster Mortuary is an existing mortuary in each of the eight Coroners' areas in London. Each designated mortuary has a given capacity (whole body or less if disruption is significant).
5. A Resilience Mortuary is a pre-fabricated structure which is on standby, ready to be called out. It is likely to be required if there are more than 75 fatalities, but may be required for lower numbers in certain areas. The Mass Fatality Co-ordination Team will agree the location for the Resilience Mortuary at the time of the incident, in consultation with the MOD.

Activation

6. The London Mass Fatality plan may be instigated when an incident occurs that is likely to overwhelm the normal procedures in place for fatalities.
7. HM Coroner will take the lead in the activation process.
8. The response will need to take into account the location of the fatalities, whether the deceased victims have been disrupted, whether the victims died simultaneously and whether contamination is involved.
9. A Disaster Mortuary, Designated or Resilience, will be set up when the incident Coroner and/or the Mass Fatality Co-ordination Team decide one is necessary (when existing facilities are insufficient).

Mass Fatality Co-ordination Team

10. The Mass Fatalities Co-ordination Team will nominate which Designated or Resilience Mortuary is allocated to the Incident. The team will comprise of:
 - The Incident Coroner
 - The Coroner covering the location of the incident or Disaster Mortuary (if different)
 - The Police Senior Investigation Officer (or their deputy)

SECTION 4 – LONDON MASS FATALITY PLAN

- A Supervising Pathologist
- A Local Authority Mortuary Manager
- The Police Senior Identification Manager (or their deputy)
- A representative of the London Resilience Team

Resilience Mortuaries

11. A Resilience Mortuary will be considered if:
 - The capacity of the designated mortuary is potentially insufficient
 - For reasons specific to the incident, the designated site is in a sub-optimal location
 - The incident involves CBRN / Hazardous Material
 - The incident suggests that essential supplies are not guaranteed (i.e. power)
 - The number of casualties or duration of the incident / threat is unknown
 - The security of the Mortuary requires a dedicated secure location
 - The duration of likely mortuary activity is such that it would seriously disrupt the local mortuary services.

CBRN Incidents

12. Should deaths occur following a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident, no actions should be taken in relation to the dead without the permission of the incident coroners, who will take advice from JHAC.

SECTION 4 – LONDON MASS FATALITY PLAN

Roles and Responsibilities Under the London Mass Fatality Plan

Police Service	The Police Service is responsible for tracing missing persons, body recovery, identification and investigating the incident. They will also manage the reception and the documentation of the deceased at the mortuary, security of the premises and provide Family Liaison Officers for investigating purposes, liaising as necessary with HM Coroners Officers and mortuary managers
Fire Service	No specific role with regards mass fatalities
Ambulance Service	No specific role with regards mass fatalities
Local Authorities	The Local Authority is responsible for establishing and equipping a Resilience Mortuary where necessary using Mutual Aid and Pan London arrangements supported by London Resilience. They are responsible for alerting Social Services, the Environment Agency and calling on support from Religious Leaders and the Voluntary Sector to assist in welfare provision for family and friends
London Resilience Team	To act as liaison point between the Strategic Co-ordinating Group and Government. Responsible for updating and maintaining the London Mass Fatality Plan and providing support including equipment required for the Resilience Mortuary
Military	May be required to provide logistical support
National Health Service	Where possible and where appropriate, the provision of support and staff.
<u>Others</u>	
HM Coroner	The Coroner has a statutory duty to hold an inquest and must authorise all procedures relating to bodies and remains. The Coroner has responsibility for the identification of victims and chairs the Identification Commission
Private Sector	Provide specific advice and support on request
Identification Commission	The aim of the Identification Commission is to identify all bodies and remains. It directs procedures, monitors progress and scrutinises all evidence relating to identity, so as to enable the Coroner to make decisions regarding their release

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SECTION 5 – LARGE-SCALE EVACUATION (OPERATION SASSOON)

1. In certain emergencies, the decision may be made to evacuate certain specific parts of central London, or Heathrow. A framework document details roles and responsibilities of those involved.
2. *The current version of the framework document was published on 31st December 2003, however work is constantly ongoing in order to develop the document and the updated version is due for completion in 2005.*

Large-Scale Evacuation Principles

3. The principle will be to evacuate the optimum number of people expeditiously and safely using the resources and infrastructure to hand. The preservation of life will be the over riding principle.
4. Large-scale evacuation will always be a last resort and the decision will need to be balanced as to whether or not the population can be afforded better protection by remaining in situ.
5. Large-scale evacuation will require specific management/command and control in addition to the incident management

Activation

6. The Duty Government Minister or COBR will make the decision to invoke the plan for Large-scale evacuation on advice of the Gold Co-ordinating Group. Information will be passed to the responding agencies as early as practicable to enable them to deploy resources.

Large-scale Evacuation Mechanisms

7. Large-scale evacuation will take place by the use of public and private transport. The Underground, bus and rail networks will be utilised.

Terminology

8. Public transport loading points (known as HUBS) have been pre-determined; people will be expected to walk to these locations, from where they will then be transported to unloading points (known as HEADS)
9. Special road routes, known as High Capacity Emergency Access Routes (HCEARS) have been designated for people who self evacuate in their own private vehicles, and to allow for the expedient access of Emergency Services Vehicles arriving from outside London.

Buses

10. Bus Evacuation loading points, (Bus Hubs), will be established by London Buses as part of TfL after the hazard zone has been identified. These locations will essentially be existing locations where buses can turn around safely and with sufficient capacity to both accommodate queuing passengers and buses.

SECTION 5 – LARGE-SCALE EVACUATION (OPERATION SASSOON)

11. On the invocation of the large-scale evacuation plan, Buses will be directed to offload passengers at locations sufficiently distanced from the hazard zone (Bus Heads). Buses will then travel non-stop to the Bus Hubs to pick up evacuees, from where they will travel non-stop along existing Bus routes to either existing outer London Bus termini points or to other locations identified on the day.
12. Thereafter buses will return to the Bus Hub collect further passengers and continue the cycle.

Rail

13. Railway stations have been identified within London, which are suitable for the embarkation of Evacuees (Rail Hubs). Typically, these stations are the existing Central London Termini, with suitable fall-backs also identified.
14. In the event of large-scale evacuation being invoked, the normal advertised timetable will be suspended and replaced by a Special Evacuation Service designed to provide a safe and simple means of transporting the maximum possible number of evacuees away from the affected area in the shortest possible time.
15. A number of railway stations in outer London and the surrounding counties have been identified jointly by the rail industry and the local authorities concerned as suitable for receipt of evacuees in terms of provision of reception centres and/or onward transport. These are known as Railheads and the intention is that a shuttle service will operate between the central London Rail Hub and the Railhead with trains returning empty from the Railhead to the Rail Hub once evacuees have been unloaded.
16. Passengers will not be conveyed towards central London and in general trains which are already London bound when mass evacuation is ordered will be stopped at the first available station and their passengers detrained before the train itself continues empty to the Rail Hub to assist in the evacuation.
17. There will be a reliance on police resources to provide crowd control, certainly at the Rail Hubs and also, as necessary, at the Railheads.

London Underground

18. London Underground evacuee loading points, (Underground Hubs) have been identified by London Underground. These locations have turn back facilities, which allow trains to transfer between running lines and thus repeatedly continue shuttles between the Rail Hub and Rail Heads
19. Underground services will arrive empty and pick up at the identified stations and then take passengers non stop to the outer zone Rail Heads.
20. Underground services will not run through the suspended area, (even empty), and they operate at frequencies no greater than those typical during off – peak times.

Roads

21. The designated High Capacity Emergency Access Routes, (HCEARs) will be fully operational, or if not, suitably identified diversionary routes will have been instigated by Transport for London and the Police.
22. There is a specific traffic plan to deal with the use of the M25 and the radial feeding motorways. It will have a reliance on police resources as blocking vehicles, protecting contractors employed on traffic management plans and physically enforcing closures.
23. Existing Emergency Services responses to road traffic collisions will no longer apply.

Air

24. An air exclusion zone will be introduced over the affected areas.

River Evacuation

25. The deployment of River Craft to facilitate evacuations over longer distances raises issues as to efficiencies associated with slow transit times and extended turn around times. However the river may be used for specific site evacuation where the movement of people over a short distance is a factor, eg Canary Wharf and the Isle of Dogs.

Evacuation Shelters

26. Local Authorities and, where possible, the voluntary sector will provide the best possible care for evacuees within the restrictions of capacity and in overwhelming circumstances. Initial reception will provide basic accommodation, out of danger, e.g. somewhere to sit, drinking water and toilet facilities - 'airport delay' style for up to 48 hours after the incident.
27. Existing concepts of 'best practice' in relation to the provision of emergency rest and reception facilities in the event of a Major Incident will not necessarily be followed.
28. Transfer arrangements between the Rail Head and pre-identified Evacuation Shelters will be arranged by the Local Authority, supported where possible by other agencies.
29. There will be an expectation for vulnerable persons to be registered on arrival at the Evacuation Centres and for information to be kept in relation to their onward movements.

SECTION 5 – LARGE-SCALE EVACUATION (OPERATION SASSOON)

Roles and Responsibilities under the large-scale Evacuation Plan

Police Service	<p>Crowd control at transport hubs</p> <p>Police presence may be necessary at the Evacuation Shelters.</p> <p>Dealing with policing issues on behalf of evacuees</p> <p>Control any media representatives attending the shelters</p> <p>Consider the deployment of FLOs to deal with bereaved persons.</p> <p>Establish Central Casualty Bureau as appropriate</p> <p>Appoint FLO co-ordinator as a priority</p> <p>Activate the Major Incident Multi Faith Plan</p> <p>Provide a Gold Incident Commander, (MPS Officer of ACPO rank) with a view to co-ordinating the resources associated with the large-scale evacuation effort.</p> <p>Provision of blocking vehicles on HCEARs</p>
Fire Service	Decontamination of evacuees as appropriate
Ambulance Service	<p>Provide facilities and resources to address the clinical decontamination of casualties</p> <p>Provide a service wherever possible at the Rail Heads and other similar sites.</p>
Local Authorities	<p>Movement of evacuees from the Rail Heads to the Evacuation Shelters.</p> <p>Receive the trains</p> <p>Provide marshals to supervise movement of evacuees to shelters</p> <p>Deploy bus and coach operators to move evacuees over distances of some miles</p> <p>Segregate evacuees according to resident or non-resident of London</p> <p>Accommodate evacuees in air-port delay style shelter for up to 48 hours</p> <p>Onward transport of evacuees</p>
London Resilience Team	<p>Provide a pre-nominated and trained Regional Nominated Co-ordinator for London Evacuation</p> <p>Provide a central point of information for the Region.</p>
Military	May be required to provide support on request
National Health Service	<p>Deal with health issues relating to the large-scale evacuation of a part of Greater London.</p> <p>Undertake detailed Contingency Planning to identify mechanisms and procedures to manage evacuation of vulnerable premises.</p>
<u>Others</u>	
Transport for London (TfL)	Provide a communications capability and media, including call centre, web site, local staff and real time bus displays at Bus stops.
TfL Street management	<p>Support designating, establishing and overseeing identified contingency routes (High Capacity Emergency Access, HCEA), including Borough Roads, available for emergency access and evacuation as necessary.</p> <p>Provide support and resources in respect of Traffic Management</p>

SECTION 5 – LARGE-SCALE EVACUATION (OPERATION SASSOON)

TfL Surface Transport	<p>systems. Undertake business continuity planning to ensure restoration and adoption of road network. Co-ordinate local authority street activities.</p> <p>Identify available transport services and their capabilities and capacities. Provide a means of co-ordination with other transport agencies ensuring that the transport mechanisms in place are compliant with each other. Arrange and manage additional transport support from: London Buses and independent contractors. River Services and independent operators. DLR & Tramlink Taxi and private hire. Responsible for the identification, establishment and management of the Bus Hubs. Undertake business continuity planning to re-establish transport access across London.</p>
London Underground	<p>Provide Underground services to support the overall evacuation strategy, including: Re-structuring network services to effect large-scale evacuation if required. Re-establishing business continuity services. Ensure co-ordination of transport response with other agencies.</p>
Network Rail	<p>Work with the train operators in managing the provision of rail services in support of the large-scale evacuation strategy. Ensure co-ordination of transport response with other agencies.</p>
Civil Aviation Authority	<p>Instigate an air exclusion zone on the advice of the 'Gold' Co-ordinating Group.</p>
British Airports Authority	<p>Address issues affecting Heathrow Airport and other BAA Airports within the South East region.</p>
Maritime & Coastguard Agency	<p>Provide appropriate support and resources in the event of a River based incident or evacuation where River vessels are deployed.</p>
Port of London Authority	<p>Provide appropriate support and resources in the event of a River based incident or evacuation where River vessels are deployed.</p>
The Highways Agency	<p>Provide advice on road closures and traffic management. Liaise with the Metropolitan Police Service and other police regarding traffic management. If appropriate, cause part or the whole of the M25 motorway to be</p>

SECTION 5 – LARGE-SCALE EVACUATION (OPERATION SASSOON)

	dedicated for use by the emergency services and agencies involved in the evacuation operation
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SECTION 6 – SITE CLEARANCE

1. The Site Clearance Plan is concerned with the removal of debris on the scale of the attack on the World Trade Centre in September 2001, which produced over 1.6m tons of debris.
2. *Relevant agencies will hold copies of the plan, the latest version of which was produced in July 2003. This version is currently being revised and an updated version is expected to be available in the summer 2005.*

Phases

3. There are four phases to the process of site clearance:
 - Rescue and Recovery
 - Site Stabilisation
 - Site Preservation (Investigation)
 - Site Clearance & Establishment of bulk debris examination site(s) /landfill site(s)

Phase One – Rescue and Recovery

4. The initial attendants of the Emergency Services will inevitably take the lead role in the immediate aftermath of an incident. They will require on call response support from government agencies and departments, local authorities and private companies to assist them in their work. The latter, with access to equipment and resources not available to the Emergency Services, are of particular relevance at this phase.

Phase Two – Site Stabilisation

5. The relevant local authority will take the lead on site stabilisation, with assistance from other local authorities (through mutual aid agreements), the Emergency Services, private contractors and government departments/agencies. As the incident progresses towards the site stabilisation phase, the emergency services (Gold Co-ordinating Group) will need to consider a formal handover to the local authority (RCCC in the Recovery Phase) in order to facilitate the authority's leading role in the return to normality and restoration of the environment.
6. It is recommended that a site clearance group be assembled as soon as possible and chaired by the Local Authority. Ongoing advice and guidance from this stage onwards will be required from the Health and Safety Executive:

Phase Three – Site Preservation (Investigation)

7. The police are responsible for securing, protecting and preserving the scene. They are also responsible for the investigation of the incident and obtaining and securing of evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable.

SECTION 6 – SITE CLEARANCE

Phase Four – Site Clearance & Establishment of bulk debris examination site(s)/landfill site(s)

8. Once relevant investigation has been completed, the site is no longer deemed a crime scene and general clearance can commence. The relevant Local Authority will lead in this phase directly supported by relevant government departments and agencies calling upon non governmental resources as required.

Landfill Sites

9. Primary and back-up sites have been identified as suitable options. As with the incident site, the landfill and Bulk Debris Examination Sites will need to be secure areas.
10. As a consequence of recovery there will be a need to establish areas where the items can be processed (examined and recorded) and stored, either temporarily or for the longer term pending the outcomes of investigation or identification processes.

Transport

11. Bulk transportation will need to be organised to remove the debris from incident site(s) to end point(s).
12. Road Transport - principal responsibility for organising the necessary requirement rests with the Lead Government Department and the relevant Local Authority.
13. Water Transport - the River Thames can be utilised as a means of transporting debris.

Police Consultation

14. SO13 (Anti Terrorist Branch) should be closely consulted during the transport phase. It may be necessary for the police to escort sensitive movements of material. It is likely that transport units may also be required to be cleaned prior to accepting loads to ensure there is no contamination of evidence.

Roles and Responsibilities under Site Clearance Plan

Police Service	Secure, protect and preserve the scene Control sightseers and traffic through the use of cordons. Identification of the dead on behalf of Her Majesty's Coroner Authorise when debris can be removed from incident site(s). Advise Local Authority and DfT re suitability of transport contractors. Assist in monitoring movement of debris from disaster site(s) to end point/landfill. The Property Services Division of the Metropolitan Police Service, in close liaison with the Anti Terrorist Branch, would have responsibility for the establishment, management and security of the forensic area at the landfill site
Fire Service	Management of hazardous materials and protecting the environment. Provision of qualified scientific advice in relation to HAZMAT incidents via their scientific advisors Salvage and damage control - liaison with Local Authority and DTI over procurement of contractors for site stabilisation and debris clearance. Safety Management within the inner cordon Maintain emergency service cover throughout the LFB area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time.
Ambulance Service	It is likely that a LAS presence would be required throughout the Site Stabilisation Phase Site Preservation Phase and Site Clearance Phase
Local Authorities	Incident Site(s): Under the guidance and direction of the emergency services be involved in the rescue and recovery and site preservation phases. Lead and co-ordinate activity during site stabilisation and site clearance phases Procure contractors for site stabilisation, debris clearance and removal (supported by Lead Government Department, DTI, DfT) End Point/Landfill Site(s): Co ordinate with DEFRA and Environment Agency re site suitability.
London Resilience Team	No specific role with regards site clearance
Military	May be requested to provide logistical support
National Health Service	No specific role with regards site clearance
<u>Others</u>	No specific role with regards site clearance

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SECTION 7 – DISASTER FUND

1. A Public Disaster Appeal Fund has been developed by the GLA for a catastrophic event occurring in the Greater London area. It is the only one endorsed and supported by the LRRF and its members in order to avoid the practical and legal confusion that may occur in the event of several funds being established. It is however subject to continual review and the GLA are liaising with the Red Cross in order to develop the project.
2. The latest version of this document is September 2003 and it is currently being reviewed.

Action to Activate the Fund

3. At the outset the fund will need a decision that it should be activated together with a number of steps to ensure that once activated it will operate effectively. The decision to activate the fund will be taken within the first six hours after an incident by the GLA.
4. The Mayor will make a public announcement stating that the fund has been established, what its purposes are and how and where the public may make donations should they so wish.

Trustees

5. Trustees will be chosen in the context of the actual incident both to bring professional and specialist knowledge to the Fund and to assist in raising its profile.

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